



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

selves, purpose and value become species of meaning. In other words, if we conceive meaning as genus, and regard it as divisible into the two species, logical (or cognitive) and affective-conative meanings, purpose and value become subspecies under the second head—purpose essentially conative meaning, value, primarily, perhaps (but not solely), affective.

JARED S. MOORE.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

La Synthèse Mentale. GEORGES DWELSHAUVERS. Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. Paris: Librairies Felix Alcan et Guillaumin. 1908. Pp. 276.

The book, as its title indicates, is a study of the mental life. It is an exposition of the nature of consciousness which Dwelshauvers characterizes in terms of a synthetic activity. Its object is to explore the content of this synthetic activity, to define that act which constitutes "the unity of mentality." It is an attack on the materialistic and sensationalistic theories that have reigned in psychology for so many years. Dwelshauvers does not pretend to have originated the problem of the mental synthesis; it is a continuation, but through a different method, of the line of work which in France has preoccupied thinkers like Maine de Biran, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Paulhan, Ribot, Pierre Janet, and many others. The fundamental idea of Höffding's "sketch of a psychology founded on experience" is, as Pierre Janet remarks in his preface to the French edition, that "consciousness is essentially an effort toward unity, a synthetic force," and that even elementary sensations,—and not only the higher types of judgment and general ideas,—are synthetic in their nature. Dwelshauvers's work, though of a different scope, is based on those fundamental assumptions.

Dwelshauvers is brought to the notion of synthesis not by metaphysical reasons, but, as he claims, through the simultaneous use of diverse methods of psychology applied to the mental fact which he attempts to define in its concrete reality, and not in abstraction. What Dwelshauvers calls the unity of the life of the mind has nothing in common with the Cartesian theory of a soul unable to have more than one idea at a time on account of its simplicity, nor with the unity of the soul such as Herbert has admitted. The unity which is presented by the mental synthesis is, according to Dwelshauvers, neither an abstract entity nor the property of a substance, but the realization more or less perfect of a complex equilibrium maintained among diverse tendencies which constitute the conscious individuality. "The synthesis of the life of the mind," to quote our author, "is neither a combination of elements nor simply an expression of logical relations, but it is an act which explains the natural way by which all of us, whether ignorants or subtle analysts, posit our ego

at the same time as we posit as equally real, *i. e.*, as subjects, other egos, or the non ego." "This act is intuitive, it is prelogic, it answers to an interior vision, to a real affirmation of faith, or more simply, of sympathy."

The book is divided into four chapters which deal respectively with (I.) the mental and cerebral activity, (II.) the unconscious, (III.) the mental life and the laws which govern it, (IV.) personality and freedom.

In the first chapter the author examines the nervous system in its relation to thought and shows that the physiology of the brain does not explain the act of thought. The nervous cells do not produce representation; representation is the work of an act of the mind. It is an interior act issued from this pure and non-spatial potentiality which mind is. The act of the mind surpasses in its richness and variety the cerebral activities which accompany it. The brain is to consciousness what the piano is to the musical artist; the instrument has a restricted number of keys, consequently the number of its movements is very limited. However, what the artist will play will vary infinitely. Viewed from its inner side, the life of the mind appears as an *élan*, an interior movement; studied in its relation with the organism which it animates, the life of the mind manifests itself as anticipation. It anticipates the nervous system, it establishes means of communication and does not make use of the means already in existence. It is essentially effort, *inextensivity*, dynamism. A mind which would be merely a synthetic consciousness of the organism would not create anything new, would not adjust itself to unexpected adaptations, in a word it would not live. Dwelshauvers, like Bergson, rejects the psychophysical parallelism and, like him, criticizes those psychological systems which speak of cerebral images, aggregates of sensation in the brain and of psychophysiological localizations. He sums up the first chapter by emphasizing the fact that we lose sight of the real problem by attributing to the brain a function which it does not possess, namely, "the formation of images, the activity of thought or ideation."

The second chapter deals with the unconscious in the mental life and its relation to conscious thought "whose continuity is assured by the movement and the depth of the unconscious life which never stops and never tires" (p. 115). The author makes an interesting study of the different forms of the unconscious, from the unconscious in the act of thought to the unconscious in the affective life. He groups them into two classes, the ultra-psychic unconsciousness and the psychic unconsciousness. The first comprises the two limits of our mental life, the rational unconsciousness which manifests itself in the act of the mind and the irrational unconsciousness which connects itself to the organism. The psychic unconsciousness manifests itself in memory and in automatism. The conclusion of this study, which is carried over to the third chapter, is that the mental life is not a series of states, "but is formed of an indeterminable number of psychic currents of different force and quality upon which there falls an ever changing illumination with an infinitely varied play of light and shade. These currents sometimes diverge, sometimes go parallel, and sometimes rejoin in order to divide again."

So far the author has endeavored to give us a conception of the mental life. He now tries, in the rest of the third chapter, to consider the laws that govern the mental life. This brings him to a consideration of the categories of quality, quantity, duration, causality, and finality, those objective categories which we are tempted to carry from the objective world into the interpretation of the mental life. He shows what a profound transformation the specificity of the spiritual life imposes on those categories. The spatial categories as well as objective causality can not apply to the mental life. Mental life differs from phenomena in this essential point that all prevision with regard to it is impossible. Causality for the psychologist does not connect phenomena and does not form an indefinite series, but unites concrete facts, ideas, sentiments, volitions to a personality. Nor is it legitimate to reduce the psychic finality to the finality applicable to the external world. They have some common characteristics, but consciousness and the will bestow upon psychic finality an altogether different value. "The life of the mind," says Dwelshauvers, "escapes the logical determination in which our reason groups phenomena. It can not be understood without a theory of freedom." This theory of freedom is the subject of the fourth chapter.

The psychological problem of liberty has no solution, according to our author, as soon as we ask with regard to a given act whether that act is free or not. Freedom has sense in psychology only for a series of acts, for the ensemble of an activity, and not for such and such an act in particular. The more a voluntary act is part of a more unified movement the more free it is. It is the force of cohesion and resistance of the ego which gives the measure of liberty. "One who prefers the unity of his interior development to the solicitations of the environment tends to act freely." Freedom is thus explained by personality and synthesis. It is that unity which is the equilibrium, the harmony, of the different tendencies that make up the conscious individuality which explains freedom. That unity, as we have already seen, is the mind, the spiritual principle par excellence, which reveals itself in the pure act, in intuition, and in reflection.

Here the author gives a historic sketch of the notion of mental synthesis held by those philosophers whose writings help us to understand better the meaning of the spiritual life. He takes up Leibniz, Kant, Wundt, Höffding, Pierre Janet, and Bergson. But it is rather surprising that the author has omitted from this list Fichte, whose doctrines, if translated in contemporary terms, have, it seems to me, something in common with those of Dwelshauvers.

The book contains, in addition to those four chapters, an appendix which gives us a critical review of the various methods used in psychology. The method with which Dwelshauvers identifies himself is the reflective method, so named and defined by Jules Lagneau. This method, as we can see from the plans followed in our present book and as Dwelshauvers describes it himself, has for aim the explanation of the logical unity which consciousness presents, the determination of its essential characteristic and the search for the laws which would enable us to under-

stand them. Dwlshauvers claims that this reflective method is superior to the other ones because it has not the shortcomings of the introspective and the psychophysical methods; that it is at the same time rational and living, rational because it brings all psychological manifestations to a unity, and living because it seeks the condition of the real,—it makes no abstraction. Dwlshauvers's method differs from the Bergsonian intuition. For the Bergsonian intuition aims to reach the bottom of the spiritual life under the stratified layers of the logic and the social, while the reflective analysis applies itself more specially to thought as ideation and reflection. It is by this method that, according to the author, we arrive at a most correct notion of the mutual implications of ideas in the concrete totality which constitutes all act of thought, of cognition, or of reflected volition.

Such is but a brief outline of the fundamental ideas underlying the book, the central thought of which is the revindication of the specific and autonomous character of our mental life. The conclusions which Dwlshauvers reaches in his work do not differ much from those of Bergson. But he comes to them through his own method, through his own original and personal way of thinking, based on deep reflections, on scientific researches, and on accumulation of facts which have been furnished to him by the experimental investigations of leading scientists. Whether or not we admit the author's theory of consciousness, we can not fail to find his book most interesting and suggestive. It is at once a contribution to and excellent representative of contemporary psychology.

NINA HIRSCHENSOHN.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Rendered into English by ELIZABETH S. HALDANE and G. R. T. ROSS. Two volumes. Cambridge University Press. 1911. Vol. I. Pp. vi + 452; Vol. II. Pp. viii + 380.

This edition makes accessible to English readers much which has been overlooked in other English renderings of Descartes. Thus far English translations have been limited almost exclusively to the "Discourse," the "Meditations," and selections of the "Principles." These works are, however, not enough to give us a comprehensible view of Descartes. The way in which he expounded his theories makes a more extensive acquaintance with his works necessary for a thorough understanding of his philosophy. Descartes never expressed freely and openly what he believed to be the truth. He gave us his ideas only in disguise; his progressive theories are veiled in conservative covers. The "Discourse," the "Meditations," and the "Principles" only arouse our suspicion of a double policy on the part of Descartes; a systematic study of his scientific treatises and his other works confirms this suspicion, and, what is more important, enables us to free the kernel of his philosophy from the husk. The present translators, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, have thus rendered an invaluable service to English readers by including some of the scientific treatises and the polemics in this edition.

Of the scientific treatises, Volume I. contains the "Rules for the Direc-